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THE JOINT FORCES AIR COMMAND PROBLEM
Is Network-centric Warfare the Answer?
Major William A. Woodcock, U.S. Air Force
The American military’s biggest problem? It lets technology drive strat-
egy, rather than letting strategy determine technology.
BRIG. GEN. DON MORELLI, USA (RET.)
The marriage of network-centric warfare and the joint forces air componentcommander concept represents a “military-technical revolution” in aero-
space command and control.1 The current system is cumbersome, and it is fall-
ing behind in its ability to deal with the fast-paced warfare of today. By its nature,
network-centric warfare (NCW) could address many of the shortfalls of the cur-
rent joint air component system. It will not, however, change the fundamental
nature of war, nor can it solve all of the current problems of the joint forces air
component commander (JFACC). This article will examine the potential and
limitations of network-centric warfare in terms of command and control and in
the context of the JFACC.
Network-centric warfare—the “effective linking or networking of knowl-
edgeable entities that are geographically or hierarchically dispersed”—promises
to raise command and control to new levels of efficiency.2 Conceptually,
NCW provides battlespace entities with “shared battlespace awareness” through
interconnectivity and networking techniques.3 These
techniques in turn allow the movement of informa-
tion and decisions at rates and efficiencies previously
unattainable. These “virtual organizations” can use
“common operational pictures” to “self-synchronize,”
potentially reducing the fog and friction of war as
well as shortening decision and execution times.4 The
ability to relay a common picture of the war and share
information with geographically dispersed sensors,
decision makers, and weapon platforms would reduce
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the time it takes them collectively to observe the situation, orient themselves to
the problem, decide what to do, and act.5 Such faster decision making would in-
crease the flexibility, lethality, and speed of airpower.
Nonetheless, and for all that network-centric warfare promises to bring to the
joint forces air component commander, there are problems that it cannot fix.
Conflicts in or problems with doctrine, inadequate or convoluted command
and control structures and procedures, and poor decision making will remain.
In any case, it cannot change the nature of warfare. “War is an act of human in-
tercourse”;6 the technology of NCW can go only so far to correct uniquely hu-
man problems. Additionally, limitations are likely to arise in relation to the
specifics of required command and control systems, connectivity, or the validity
of the JFACC concept itself. These matters are necessarily beyond the scope of
this article, which assesses the likelihood that network-centric warfare can dra-
matically increase the efficiency and flexibility with which air warfare is
conducted.
In its current form, the joint forces air component commander is the central ele-
ment of the concept that (in the view of the U.S. Air Force) combines centralized
command and control of air assets with decentralized execution of air warfare.7
Under joint doctrine, the joint air commander, whose function is to control air
and space power in a given area of operations, is appointed by and works directly
for the joint forces commander.8 The JFACC concept also incorporates key ten-
ets of specifically Air Force airpower doctrine: “Air and Space power must be
controlled by an airman who maintains a broad strategic and/or theater per-
spective in prioritizing the use of limited air and space assets to attain the objec-
tives of all U.S. forces in any contingency across the range of operations.”9
History is full of examples of the perils of dividing up airpower assets and of the
advantages of centrally controlling them.10 The Air Force believes that parceling
airpower out to various agencies and among various tasks will negate its inher-
ent qualities of mass, flexibility, and transcendent scope—that is, its freedom
from limitation by geography, water depth, road conditions, etc. The service’s
doctrine declares that the joint forces air component commander should be “an
airman who maintains a broad and/or theater perspective,” for reasons of per-
spective that would become particularly relevant with the advent of network-
centric warfare.
THE ISSUES
As a preliminary to evaluating NCW’s potential contribution, it is important
to understand the problems and issues of the current organization and tasks
of joint forces air component command. Most prominent are a myriad of
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difficulties arising from centralization: most of the functions for which the joint
air commander is responsible—planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, and
executing air operations in accordance with the joint forces commander’s objec-
tives—are conducted in a single air operations center.11 The first of this category
of issues is that the concentration of tasks makes the air operations center (or
AOC) a critical—and vulnerable—node in the command and control of a major
element of U.S. military forces. Its destruction would virtually cripple air opera-
tions. All of the air operations center’s functions are singular; there are no back-
ups for them. The system has no “redundancy” in this respect; it cannot deal
with a loss of the AOC.
Second, due to its size—it has a staff of roughly 1,300 and considerable equip-
ment and other infrastructure—the air operations center is both cumbersome
and difficult to move. Deployment requires a substantial logistical effort.12 The
large “footprint” of an air operations center also puts a premium on physical
plant; AOCs must now be housed in large, hardened facilities. Any sensitivity of
host nations to the presence of a large number of Americans and representatives
of U.S. coalition partners adds to the problems of locating the center.
In addition, the AOC’s large size makes it difficult to establish aboard a ship.
The absence of the sea-basing option in a world in which suitable facilities
ashore may not be available is a serious limitation. An afloat joint forces air com-
ponent commander would enjoy greatly increased flexibility, especially in situa-
tions in which the Navy provides the preponderance of airpower.13
The current structure is also inflexible with regard to contingencies and circum-
stances. The war in Kosovo highlighted this deficiency. As the Defense Department
later reported to Congress, “Operation Allied Force highlighted the need for the De-
partment to develop expeditionary air operations centers and equip them with sup-
porting resources and manpower to enable U.S. forces to create combined air
operations centers that can be tailored to the crisis at hand and deployed quickly.”14
Under the current structure, the command and control of aerospace power
resides by definition in a single person. The amount of information and the
scope and rapidity of decision making involved in planning and executing an air
campaign is enormous, far beyond the physical capabilities of any one human
being.15 In practice, the bulk of this effort is shouldered by the air operations
center staff. However, the commander, in person, remains the final authority—
and is therefore a single point of failure. If the joint air commander were some-
how removed from the battle, the ramifications could be catastrophic.
A final problem related directly to centralization is that keeping an air opera-
tions center staff trained for its wartime functions is a mammoth task. Com-
mand and control involves perishable skills that atrophy in the absence of
training. The experience of ULCHI FOCUS LENS, a joint and combined command
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and control exercise series conducted by the Seventh Air Force in the Republic of
Korea, is illustrative. To assume its wartime configuration for these evolutions,
the Seventh Air Force’s air operations center requires hundreds of augmentees
from other commands. Many more people are needed just to run the simulation
and represent the roles of the various coordinating entities. An exercise like
ULCHI FOCUS LENS is productive and effective, but it is expensive and time con-
suming, and it meets the training needs of only a single JFACC.
Aside from the specific problems caused by the centralized nature of the cur-
rent structure, there are fundamental weaknesses in several basic procedural ar-
eas. A number of processes that have been reasonably effective in the past are no
longer able to meet the demands of modern warfare.
The first of these is the air tasking order, the single-source plan for all air op-
erations in an area of operations in a twenty-four-hour period. The air tasking
order assigns to individual units their targets, weapons, and arrival times over
those targets. Second, it tells all
“players” what will be going on
around them as they execute their
missions; this “deconfliction” is
critical to the execution of aerial
operations, to avoid fratricide and
duplication of effort and increase the safety of flight. Already, however, a given
day’s air tasking order takes anywhere from thirty-six to forty-eight hours to
produce.16 By the time the order is issued, the majority of its assumptions, analy-
ses, and targeting decisions are out of date.
A second issue is that of target recognition and identification, one of the most
severely limiting factors in the high-speed warfare of today. The need for speed is
particularly critical in the prosecution of “time-sensitive” (that is, moving) sur-
face targets. The problem they represent is not new but is receiving increased vis-
ibility in light of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, mobile
surface-to-air missile launchers, and theater ballistic missiles. Too often, by the
time the target is analyzed and identified, it is no longer visible. The limiting in-
herent factors in the prosecution of fleeting targets are the processes of detection
and identification. Current technology has not caught up with requirements;
these tasks are not being performed rapidly enough. Another vital piece of the
identification puzzle is the threat of fratricide. In DESERT STORM, coalition
forces suffered 107 casualties to friendly fire.17 In a casualty-conscious world,
and for a technologically advanced military, this is unacceptable.
This litany of problems with the joint forces air component command struc-
ture of today, as long as it is, is not all-inclusive. There are other problems, such
as service doctrine disputes, connectivity, and joint integration. Network-
W O O D C O C K 1 2 7
For all that network-centric warfare promises
to bring to the JFACC, there are problems that
it cannot fix.
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/7
centric warfare cannot address them; however, it has great potential to bring im-
provements to the particular problem areas we have discussed.
WHAT NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE CAN DO FOR THE JFACC
Network-centric warfare’s major contribution in the arena of command and
control will reside in its ability to assimilate large amounts of data, translate the
data into coherent and useful information, and provide conduits that allow the
key decision makers to communicate and collaborate at speeds currently unreal-
ized and then quickly pass their decisions to weapon platforms. Additionally,
NCW will distribute shared “awareness” to all battlespace entities. It is these
qualities that must be capitalized upon if the current shortcomings of joint
forces air component command are to be alleviated.
By its very nature, the connectivity NCW provides permits decentralization
of the joint forces air component command infrastructure. Networking would
enable a “virtual” air operations center;18 its functions would no longer need to
be collocated. The vulnerability of the AOC would be reduced, and therefore
that of the command and control system as well—it would no longer have a sin-
gle “pressure point.” A geographically dispersed system is, by nature, less suscep-
tible to attack and collapse. Additionally, networking would allow for parallel
operations, and thus for redundancy at critical nodes. For example, an alternate
joint air commander and staff, themselves geographically distributed, might
monitor operations; should the JFACC be forced to move or be lost in combat,
the alternate could take over operations seamlessly. Single-point failures could
virtually be eliminated; the robustness of such a system would be invaluable as
the intensity of warfare increases.
The ability of NCW to decentralize functions also makes possible
“reachback,” by which functions could be located in relatively safe locations,
perhaps the continental United States.19 Even well to the rear, such functions re-
main on the network, connected to all the other nodes. The ability of an air oper-
ations center simply to “reach back” to a Defense Department agency, say, for
support would yield several benefits.
First, it would reduce the size of the center’s staff. The fact that not all seg-
ments of the AOC staff deploy would mean less equipment, fewer people, and a
smaller support base to be moved forward. This in turn makes the air operations
center more able to use austere facilities. It also minimizes U.S. and coalition
presence on foreign soil.
Second, the joint forces air component commander could move aboard ship.
As we have seen, JFACCs are currently hindered from moving to sea by the size
of their staffs and the command-and-control systems they require.20 Afloat op-
erations are advantageous for several reasons in addition to those already noted.
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In a given situation, a carrier battle group may be first on the scene; when the
main focus of effort shifted toward the land, the transition to a shore-based joint
air commander would be greatly eased if an organization were already function-
ing at sea. Afloat operations may not always be the option of choice, but network-
centric warfare promises to make them a viable option.
Third, NCW-based reachback would allow specialized agencies to participate
effectively in forward operations. In so complex an undertaking as national se-
curity, pockets of special expertise and capability inevitably emerge. Such orga-
nizations such as the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, CHECKMATE, and many others provide unique “skill sets” in
vital disciplines.21 However, in an era of reduced manning and uncertain bud-
gets, they are less and less able to send forward fully capable detachments to sup-
port staffs in combat areas; network-centricity would allow joint air commanders
and their staffs to tap such expertise at its various sources, rapidly, efficiently,
and as they need it; networking would also allow air operations centers to dele-
gate some of their workloads.
As an example of the force-multiplying effect of rear-area expertise in the
planning and execution of air warfare, take the case of hardened, deeply buried
targets, today an emerging “target set.” Vital enemy command-and-control and
weapons-of-mass-destruction facilities are typically protected in this way. Lo-
cating them and gathering and analyzing intelligence on them are difficult and
time-consuming tasks. Network-centric organization would allow data to be
sent, for instance, to the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, which possesses the spe-
cialists and analytical tools necessary to discern whether valid targets have been
found and if so, to determine the best way to attack them. Their solutions will
probably be of better quality than those air operations centers could produce
themselves.
Finally, no two scenarios are the same, a reality that places a premium on the
flexibility of an air operations center. Not all components of the notional AOC
structure are needed in all situations. Network-centric warfare would allow the
joint forces air component commander to tailor a virtual organization to the
task at hand. By virtue of such NCW fundamentals as reachback and network-
ing, only organizations necessary for a given mission need be “brought to the
fight.” This point is particularly relevant for such major headquarters as regional
commands; indeed, the current crisis management philosophy of European
Command is to build joint task forces from the ground up, tailoring them to meet
particular crises.22 This approach represents a marked departure from the tradi-
tional concept of standing task forces and air operations centers;23 network-
centric warfare should give regional and joint task force commanders the ability to
form trained air component command structures on short notice.
W O O D C O C K 1 2 9
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Network-centric warfare will mitigate a subtle danger inherent in reliance
upon a centralized decision-making entity—the equating of the concepts of
“command” and “control.” They have been inexorably linked for years, but they
are very different notions. Command has been defined as “the exercise of au-
thority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces
in the accomplishment of the mission.”24 “Control,” joint doctrine declares, “is
inherent in command.”25 Even so, “control” embraces the “procedures employed
by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces
and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.”26 In short, command is
authority, and control is a process. Ultimately, command authority over a joint
force’s air and space assets rests
with its air component com-
mander; network-centricity will
significantly enhance the JFACC’s
ability to exercise it. Improved
connectivity with subordinates
will enhance the joint air commander’s ability to “direct people and organizations
into actions to accomplish missions.”27
Networking will also allow joint forces air component commanders to dele-
gate control more effectively. The primary rationale in the past for centralized
command and control was that generally only the commander had “the whole
picture.”28 NCW makes it possible to extend, to levels not previously feasible,
“distributive control”—delegation of responsibilities and processes to levels or
organizations best suited to them—and thereby achieve not only lessened vul-
nerability but faster decision cycles and operational tempos. In a network-centric
force, vital information is distributed to all appropriate levels of control, de-
pending on the mission; experts in particular disciplines—given the knowledge
and authority required to assess, decide, act, and control—can achieve smaller
and more efficient response cycles than were ever before possible.
Properly trained subordinates, with clear and firm guidance from the joint
forces air component commander, will be informed and connected decision
makers. In a network-centric system, however, the onus is on commanders to
ensure that a correct understanding of their overall intentions and the objectives
of particular operations pervades the control structure. “Mission-type or-
ders”—telling subordinates what needs to be done, not how—issued through a
network in conjunction with air tasking orders will provide control elements the
guidance they need.29 Properly designed and reinforced by education, training,
and doctrine, centralized command and decentralized control would allow the
joint forces air component commander to employ aerospace power with maxi-
mal effectiveness.
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Training, however, as we have pointed out, is one of the most pressing short-
comings of air component command. The level of skill in the command and
control of aerospace power is presently inadequate.30 Here again, network-
centric concepts would bring in a new era.
The current effort in the Air Force to eliminate the expertise problem is the
“AOC as a Weapons System” program.31 The concept is to make the training of
members of centers mirror that given for weapon systems, such as fighters and
bombers. AOC staffs will be required to maintain complex qualifications com-
mensurate with their wartime roles. Presently, initial training is given at the
Command and Control Warriors School, a division of the Command and Con-
trol Training Innovations Group at Hurlburt Field, Florida.32 Final mission-
qualification training is accomplished within the assigned air operations centers.
The current major deficiency is fidelity; interactions with agencies that are geo-
graphically distant or not manned in peacetime must be simulated. Network-
centric organization, because it would keep the entire virtual AOC connected at all
times, would raise the frequency and quality of training.
Theoretically, virtual battles can be fought within the existing network;33
however, that involves large, cumbersome, off-board computer systems, such as
a system known as the Air Warfare Simulator. NCW architecture would allow
higher-fidelity training by connecting existing systems so as to replicate an ac-
tual battle space.34 Its “virtual environment” capabilities could simulate battle
spaces within the architecture of the system.35 Since all involved entities would
be connected to the system anyway, deployments of masses of people and equip-
ment to support training would be eliminated. Network-centricity would im-
prove the realism and value of war gaming and training, at a great reduction in
cost.
This capability would also mean that more people could be trained per unit
of time in AOC operations. Since airpower is an inherently joint endeavor, com-
bined and joint training is crucial. With the necessary equipment, allies and
other services could train in the virtual environment. Joint forces air component
commanders of other services—anywhere, including aboard ship—could train
with a virtual air operations center. In the process, joint air commanders could
tailor their organizations and think out exercising lines of communication,
command-and-control relationships, information flows, and decision-making
processes in advance. Air operations centers should not be limited to ad hoc,
“come as you are” responses to crises; network-centric warfare can bring this
principle to reality.
One of the fundamental characteristics of network-centric warfare—flexi-
bility through ability to share battlespace awareness—can directly address
one of the most cumbersome and inflexible aspects of the current joint air
W O O D C O C K 1 3 1
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component system, the air tasking order. As noted earlier, production of ATOs
is a lengthy process. Because they represent an entire theater’s air effort, they can
be over nine hundred pages in length.36 NCW offers a more responsive and less
burdensome approach. Shared battlespace awareness, in the form of a common
operational picture, would already be available to all players; in fact, they would
have a degree of situational awareness not previously possible. Tasking could be
transmitted to individual subordinates, in plain view of all interested parties.
Because the orders could therefore be timelier, they could better reflect changing
battlespace situations. Additionally, fratricide could be virtually eliminated. Be-
cause all commands would possess a real-time and accurate “picture” of the bat-
tle space, even in the heat of battle they would be able to identify definitively
their targets prior to engaging them; their displays would alert them if they were
about to engage a “friendly.”
Further, a well-fused picture would bring improvements to another area we
have mentioned as a weakness: the detection, identification, and prosecution of
time-sensitive surface targets.37
The necessary advances—more
responsive tasking of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets; rapid sharing and analysis
of the raw information; and transmission of high-fidelity, “targetable” data to a
weapon platform in time to use it—will be hallmarks of network-centric
warfare.
The prosecution of moving surface targets and theater missile defense
(TMD) have many information needs in common, including timely detection,
accurate analysis and identification, and immediate communication with weap-
ons systems capable of engaging targets. In a networked environment, there is
no necessity, as now, to compete for this information (which might be closely
held by agencies for classification or bureaucratic reasons); it can be shared be-
tween and collaborated on by people not necessarily at the same location. Such
collaboration in real time constitutes “self-synchronization,” a prerequisite for
the quick and efficient prosecution of such difficult but important targets.38
Agencies and commands specializing in moving ground targets and TMD, re-
spectively, can collaborate not only in analysis but in selecting the best means to
strike the target. A weapon platform normally assigned to one of these func-
tional areas can be used to attack a target of the other. With the proper delega-
tion of control, both surface and theater-missile targets could be disposed of
with rapidity not possible today.
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
By the time the air tasking order is issued, the
majority of its assumptions and targeting
decisions are out of date.
9
Woodcock: The Joint Forces Air Command Problem
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
WHAT NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE CANNOT DO
For all of the capabilities that NCW could bring to joint forces air component
commanders and their air operations centers, there are several things that can-
not be expected from it. Above all, NCW cannot replace people. Warfare is a
uniquely human endeavor. Technology can allow war to be waged more effi-
ciently but cannot change its nature. In the very nature of things, human judg-
ment will always be required in the planning and execution of operations in
wartime: “Human flexibility and common sense transcend the realm of logic.”39
Such intangibles as personal experience, intuition, insight, and charisma will
always be prerequisites of effective leadership. Network-centric warfare can cer-
tainly aid in the decision-making process, but it cannot replace the decision
maker. Let us take a historical, and dramatic, example.
Shortly after the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) came
on line, it detected what appeared to be a launch of intercontinental ballistic
missiles from the Soviet Union. A committee instantly convened to determine
whether an attack was actually in progress. One of its members recalled that the
Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was in New York at the time. It seemed
highly unlikely the Soviets would launch an attack with their leader so exposed;
the committee accordingly decided that what looked like a Soviet missile launch
was not. It was later determined that the powerful BMEWS radars had been re-
ceiving returns from the moon. This possibility had not been anticipated, and
the BMEWS software had erroneously interpreted the indications as a missile
launch.40 Not every contingency can be imagined when systems are being devel-
oped; human decision makers must be the final authority.
Another problem from the human perspective is information overload.41
Network-centric organization, if not properly regulated, can actually add to the
friction of war by inundating decision makers with data. A related danger is
blind trust in technology, the common perception that data from a machine
must be accurate. Some commanders tend to discount human analysis and act
instead on the basis of “infallible” computer-derived solutions.42 Obviously, ma-
chines are fallible, because the people who design, produce, and program them
are fallible. Information technology cannot “heal” itself of bad logic or flawed
data. Consequently, caution must be exercised; too much of the wrong informa-
tion can be more dangerous than too little of the right information.
Further, network-centric warfare will not change the principles of sound
command. There is a tendency among senior commanders to extend their direct
control to lower and lower levels. One reason is that all senior commanders were
once commanders at lower levels, and some of them feel they know those jobs
better than the people now in charge there. NCW can, in fact, facilitate
micromanagement at levels and to degrees never before attainable. With instant
W O O D C O C K 1 3 3
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connectivity with all players and a resultant false sense that they know every-
thing about every aspect of the battle, commanders and senior civilian authori-
ties may be tempted more strongly than ever to assert themselves in
inappropriate ways. In the words of a former commandant of the Marine Corps,
General Charles C. Krulak, “Molecular management of our forces is not the
school solution.”43 Only trust of subordinates, gained through education,
proper doctrine, and training, can lessen this problem.
The air operation over Kosovo was by far the most “connected” conflict the
United States has yet fought.44 As such, it provides a glimpse of the potential
dangers inherent in network-centric warfare, by highlighting the miscarriages
that are already possible. Stories are told of strategic and operational commanders
directing at the tactical level. For instance, the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe had in his office a terminal that allowed him to view what Predator un-
manned aerial vehicles in the air were seeing.45 During one mission, three vehicles
that looked like tanks appeared on the supreme allied commander’s screen. He
picked up a telephone, called the joint forces air component commander, and di-
rected that those tanks be destroyed.46 With a single call, based on incomplete in-
formation, all the levels of war, from strategic to tactical, had been short-circuited.
Top-down control exercised to this extreme is potentially quite dangerous. As
we have seen, the volume of information that is and will be available during
combat situations is beyond the ability of one person to grasp. It is for this rea-
son that Air Force doctrine calls for unity of command and requires the joint
forces air component commander to “maintain a broad and/or theater perspec-
tive.”47 Network-centric organization cannot be allowed to obviate this funda-
mental requirement.
Network-centric warfare seems to possess the peculiar and unfortunate qual-
ity of magnifying the consequences of bad doctrine and bad decisions.
Ironically, the formal and cumbersome processes of command and control
served in the past to dampen and somewhat mitigate such effects. In World War
II, Adolf Hitler was very much involved in his army’s day-to-day battles.
Thinking that he knew what was going on at the front—that the radio, teletype,
and telex were giving him up-to-the-minute reports—Hitler would send de-
tailed orders. In fact, however, there was an inherent and substantial time lag in
the reporting system. By the time his orders were received back at the front they
had typically been overtaken by events and simply added to confusion. By de-
fault, field commanders who were effective in combat made the necessary deci-
sions. Those who waited for Hitler’s delayed guidance or tried to implement it
after the fact were crushed by the enemy.48
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TRAINING, SPEED, TRUST, AND EFFICIENCY
From the foregoing analysis, several recommendations can be made. The first is
that advantage be taken of network-centric concepts to make the air operations
center lighter, less centralized, and more flexible. The need to deploy air opera-
tions centers rapidly into dynamic and unanticipated situations mandates this.
The constructs of expeditionary warfare need to be applied to command and
control systems and architecture. It can be accomplished through reachback and
networking, as already described.
Second, in a NCW environment, the concept of “control” needs to be reevalu-
ated as something separate from “command.” The argument that control needs
to be restricted to higher headquarters because only they have all pertinent in-
formation is no longer valid. Network-centric warfare promises to make a com-
mon operational picture available at all levels of control. This distributed
knowledge, allowing all commanders to distribute a sense of their purposes
equally widely, will allow control of assets at lower levels. That, in turn, will
speed the decision-making process.
Third, NCW should be used to train JFACCs and their staffs “jointly.” Net-
working geographically dispersed entities and services will enable robust and re-
alistic training scenarios at a fraction of the cost of today’s single-location
exercises. It will become practical to exercise command-and-control structures
more often and across service boundaries. Such training, in the air-component
community, will serve three purposes: it will allow commanders to prepare their
staffs to respond properly in time of crisis; it will develop and inculcate doctrine
and resolve interservice disputes; and it will enable organizations to train as they
will fight. In this way trust and confidence will be built among joint forces air
component commanders and their staffs, and also among higher authorities to-
ward their subordinates. This trust and confidence should reduce the temptation
to micromanage; as Air Force service doctrine states, the focus of the joint forces
air component commander needs to remain at strategic and operational levels.49
Finally, the development of network-centric systems needs to focus on mak-
ing the control of airpower more efficient. The air tasking order process needs to
be replaced. The moving surface target problem needs to be solved. In general,
joint forces air component commanders and their operations centers need to
operate with greater speed and efficiency. Properly developed, network-centric
warfare will allow all these things to happen.
The application of network-centric principles to the joint forces air component
commander concept would represent a large leap ahead in the command and
control of air assets. Many of the shortcomings of the present system could be
resolved using NCW principles and technology; others could not be. However,
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the truly important goal is to prevent technology from driving theory. Technol-
ogy represents capabilities, present and future. It is not enough to say, “What can
technology do?” We must ask, “What do we need it to do?” Network-centric war-
fare is a tool; if it is to be useful, it must have a defined purpose. There must exist
well-thought-out doctrine to guide its development. We have discussed here
possible first principles by which to shape the evolution, and initiate the integra-
tion, of network-centric warfare and the joint forces air component
commander.
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